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Escape of the German Army
across the Westerscheldt,
September 1944
S.J. de Groot
he writing of this article was made possible
by Mr. K. Schacht (Steinkirchen), former
T
officer of the
who gave me the
Bundesmarlne,

unpublished script of Mr. F. Roher. 1 Mr. Roher
belonged to the Krlegsmarlne and took part in
operations in the Dutch waters in 1944. He put
together a captivating document. Some
additional research had to be done to put it in a
clear and complete perspective. The fact that a
specially formed unit of the Krlegsmarlne was
able, in 15 days, to ferry across the Westerscheldt
100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000 horsedrawn wagons and 750 pieces of artillery,
undoubtably lengthened the war and the
occupation of a large part of the Netherlands.
The evacuation across the Wester-Scheldt surely
can be found in literature. The role of the
Kriegsmarine, however, forms a forgotten
chapter, even more so because the event was
overshadowed by the long battle for the mouth
of the Scheidt. Now, 50 years after the event.
through examination of the facts gathered by Mr.
Roher, we will have to admit this was a
remarkable logistical operation that was
perfectly executed under the most difficult
conditions.

Background
he Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day
were followed by months of bitter fighting.
T
Slowly but surely the German forces were driven
out of France, and the German 15th Army was
pushed from the area where it had been stationed
for the invasion, namely north of the Seine, and
into Belgium. This army belonged to Army Group
B (Model). Because the retiring Germans nestled
themselves stubbornly in the Channel ports and

could not easily be driven out of them, the
advancing Allied armies were getting into
problems with their logistics. At this point in
the war, and in fact up until the end of November
when the large port facilities at Antwerp were
finally opened, the bulk of Allied units and
supplies were still being landed over the D-Day
beaches. The few captured Channel ports did
not have the capacity to take over this function.
It was essential to get the port of Antwerp into
operation to ease the logistical situation. On 4
September, Antwerp, with its harbour
installations intact, was taken practically without
a blow. However, until the banks of the Scheidt
estuary could be cleared, the British Army had
to be supplied along the road from Bayeux, a
distance of 375 km. The American Army had
the famous "Red Ball Express" that brought daily
7,000 tons of supplies for Bradley's Army. 2
It is still a point of contention why the British
and Canadian troops after the fall of Antwerp
hesitated so long to push northward. Not until 2
October, nearly a month after the capture of
Antwerp, did they begin the clearance operations.
A very important factor, beside the logistic
problems, was the tenacious resistance given by
the 15th Army. Their new commander, General
G. von Zangen, realised that the largest part of
his army was threatened to be trapped between
the Scheidt and North Sea on the one side and
the liberated part of the Netherlands on the other.
Beside the strategically important object of
keeping the mouth of the Scheidt closed off as
long as possible and therefore preventing the use
of the harbour by the Allies, there was now the
need to save as many units as possible from the
danger of the threatening encirclement. Only via
the Breskens-Vlissingen and Terneuzen-
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The short distance across the Westerscheldt is clearly illustrated in
this photo takenfrom Breskens looking across to Vlissingen.
(Photo by Donald I. Grant. NAC PA 142253)

Hansweert crossings of the Scheidt, and from
there across Walcheren and South Beveland,
could they reach North Brabant. This made
defence of the strip of land just north of Antwerp
near Woensdrecht vitally important. This was the
only route to the mainland for German troops
who had been evacuated across the
Westerscheldt. 3 Von Zangen requested the help
of the German Navy in the Netherlands to ferry
his troops across the Westerscheldt. It is at this
point that Rohrer's account starts.

Sonderstab Knuth

I

t was on 4 September 1944 that the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy,
Vice-Admiral G. Kleikamp, warned the staff of
Army Group B that Antwerp could only be held
for another five days. 4 But on the same day as
this warning British troops took the city. It was
not clear to the German High Command where
the 15th Army was; it was presumably pushed
up against the coast between Nieuwpoort and
Breskens. On 6 September the Commander-inChiefWest, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt,

warned Admiral Kleikamp, to take care of the
ferrying of the 15th Army across the Scheidt.
The 1st Sicherungsdivision ofthe Kriegsmarine,
with headquarters in Utrecht, received the order
to execute this task with the greatest haste. There
were no plans ready for an evacuation of about
120,000 men with all their equipment, vehicles
and artillery. The day before, the order had been
given to destroy all harbours, harbour
installations, locks and canals. This order was
rescinded and the commander of the 1st
Sicherungsdivision, KapitanzurSee Knuth, was
charged with the evacuation operation.
Knuth had only been the commander for a
few months. Right away the order was given to
direct all surface ships via Dordrecht to the
Scheidt. Part of the River Flotilla (Kapitan zur
See H. Engel) was already on the Scheidt. 5 Engel
requisitioned rescue material on a large scale.
Knuth formed the "Sonderstab Knuth,"
consisting of himself, Kapitdnleutnant der
Reserve R. W. Peters and Oberleutnant zur See
der Reserve G. Kramps. He was ready to move
to the theatre of operations on 6 September at
2300 hours. Together with his chauffeur he made
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the 250 kilometre long drive to Middelburg
during the night. It was a difficult trip through
dark streets, with many detours because of
blown up bridges and danger from the air. They
reached Middelburg 0500 hours the next
morning. The local commander supplied them
with an escort and they went ahead to the
headquarters of General von Zanger in the village
bunker. The commander of the 15th Army Corps
had arrived there the night before. The 15th
Army itself was situated between Zeebrugge,
Terneuzen and Breskens. The troops would be
gradually withdrawn with Breskens as the last
bridgehead. This bridgehead had to be held as
long as possible in order to deny the Allies access
to the Scheidt. Von Zanger insisted in principle
on bringing across as many men as possible.
Knuth and his staff went to Vlissingen where the
32nd Minesweeper Flotilla (consisting of
transformed fishing boats) and the Outpost
Boatgroup "Windhuk" were to be stationed. In

Putte

THESCHELDT
ESTUARY
Vlissingen they formed the staff responsible for
the evacuation. The staff was soon joined by the
ships from "Windhuk," the Vp 2004, Vp 2007
and Vp 2011, and two Artillerietrager of the 1st
Artillerietrager Flotilla. 6 Shortly, Knuth and his
staff were joined by the commanding officer of
the 32nd Flotilla, Korvettenkapitan Jacobi, the
commander of the Sea Defence Southern
Netherlands, KapitanzurSee F. Aschmann, and
the Vlissingen harbour commander,
Korvettenkapitan der Reserve R. Wurdeman.
It was evident that in the preceding days,
more or less chaotic, some scattered units and
their arms were brought across the Scheidt. This
had taken place using the ferries Queen
Wilhelmina and Queen Emma, requisitioned
Dutch fishing boats and the Kriegfischkutters
(KFKs) of the 32nd Flotilla. Troops were ferried
across at two locations, Breskens-Vlissingen and
Terneuzen-Hansweert. It was estimated that, up
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Allied photo-reconnaissance clearly revealed the extent of
German movements during the month of September.
Top: Two German vessels race into the harbour at Vlissingen after completing the crossing from Breskens on
11 September. Numerous other vessels are visible tied up in the main harbour. At this stage there is little bomb
damage evident in the port.
(WLU Air Photo Collection 16413045)
Above left: A convoy of vessels clears the harbour at Breskens, just visible on the left, 11 September 1944.
(WLU Air Photo Collection 15913237)
Above right: The ships making the passage between Breskens and Vlissengen made ideal targets for air
attack due to the clear weather and their highly visible wakes.
(WLU Air Photo Collection 159 I 4239)
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Above: The outer harbour of Ternuezen filled wit/1 shipping on 13 September.
(WLU Air Photo Collection 1 74 I 4001)
Below: Towards the end of the evacuation, heavy bomb damage is visible in Breskens, 22 September. In
spite qf this, Allied air power did little to hinder the German retreat.
(WLU Air Photo Collection 192 I 4002)
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"Scheldt Crossing" by D.A. Colville
(Canadian War Museum CN 12205)

to 7 September, 25,000 men were ferried across.
This left 100,000 men still on the south side of
the Scheidt. The operation began with 60 ships
but this was quickly increased to 75. As well,
the original Dutch crews were replaced with
German personnel. There was doubt about the
full cooperation of the Dutch, and the fact that
the vessels would be in service around the clock. 7
Because the situation at the embarkation
points threatened to get out of hand, Knuth asked
Kleikamp to take the necessary steps to ferry
the constant stream of soldiers as effectively as
possible and transport them to the east.
Assembly points, road commanders and
interception units had to be installed. Two
officers of the 32nd Flotilla's staff were used to
regulate the boarding, Oberleutnant zur Seeder
Reserve Lessing in Breskens and an adjutantboatsman at Terneuzen. At the opposite shore

these functions were performed by the Vlissingen
harbour commander and officers of the 32nd
Flotilla, and at Hansweert by Korvettenkapitan
Stein.
As order was brought to the operation, the
15th Army started to select essential material
for the crossing. Also, the motor vehicles were
repacked so as to make the most efficient use of
space. A defensive line was created between
Breskens and Terneuzen (Nieuwvliet, Oostburg,
Ijzendijke, Boekhoute, Assenede, Sas van Gent,
Axel). Assembly points and dressing stations
were arranged. The transportation of the
wounded, first on ordinary ships, was continued
on hospital ships.
Sonderstab Knuth took as their
headquarters the commando-bunker of the
Vlissingen Navy Commander. In the meantime,
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the communication material arrived from
Utrecht under the command of Kapitanleutnant
N. Godehart. In addition to providing
communications between the ships and the staff
on shore and higher echelons, this unit of the
1st Sicherungsdivision also took care of the
battle information (B. Dienst). To lessen the risk
of air attacks, the communication vehicles were
set up in Veere. 8
The work of the staff charged with the
crossing entailed, however, much more. It was
essential to bring the units across with all their
vehicles, so that these units could be on the road
to the east to escape the threatened closure of
South Beveland. Much heavy material, namely
heavy trucks and artillery, were moved by ship
directly to their temporary end position.
Preparations had to be made for the installation
of mines and obstructions near Doel. Besides
this, they had to regularly sweep for mines at
the crossing locations. To the south of the Scheidt
they formed a special group from the 344th
Infantry Division to make order and keep it.
Unofficial crossings were stopped.

Hansweert. There were eight to ten KFKs and
six motorboats of the Rhine flotilla active here,
also a Siebel jahre (a type oflanding ship vehicle
transport) and five or six navy lighters (MarineFahrprahme). This route was much longer than
the Breskens-Vlissingen route, so there were only
two crossing a night possible (and often only
one). The inner harbour ofTerneuzen proved to
be an ideal place for the loading of heavy railway
artillery (21 em). The fact that this material, once
loaded, could be shipped directly through the
South Beveland canal northwards, made this
loading point very valuable. The improvement
of order among the troops around Terneuzen was
charged to the 17th Luftwaffe Field Division.
10 September

The weather improved and 5,000 soldiers
were taken across. The outpost boats could
transport 300 soldiers or 15 cars a ship, while
the anti-aircraft guns could be fully used. New
reinforcements arrived in Vlissingen - namely
eight KFKs of the 36th Minesweeper Flotilla.
11 September

The Day-by-Day Story
7 and 8 September

The bad weather made the crossing much
tougher and the organisation of the Sonderstab
was not yet felt.
9September

The need for the larger ferries was quite clear.
Besides vehicles and other material, these ships
could take 300 to 400 men across per trip from
Breskens to Vlissingen. Units of the 36th
Minesweeper Flotilla also took part in the
evacuation. Anti-aircraft defences had to be
improved. The ferries were equipped with 2 em
anti-aircraft guns (the Queen Wilhelmina with
four guns and the Queen Emma with two). The
Artillerietragers travelling with the ferries were
responsible for their air defences. In principle
they sailed day and night when there was no
danger from the air. It was here that the B Dienst
in Veere played a very important role. This day
they took across heavy motorized artillery ( 17
em). This took place on the route Terneuzen-

More soldiers than the day before could be
ferried across. Two Raumboote (fast shallowwater minesweepers), the R-83 and R-85, took
part in the operation from this day. The first
heavy air attacks took place on Breskens. The
air defences were constantly strengthened,
supplied from the material of the 15th Army.
The air attacks caused 120 dead and wounded,
beside a heavy loss of materials. The place of
embarkation, Breskens, was out off commission
for ten hours. But thanks to building materials
from the destroyed houses in the area, the
hoardings were not delayed any longer.
12 September

At 0400 hours the crossing was again in full
swing. More and more dug-outs for the men were
built. In Breskens they took care that the BOOmetre-long street leading to the boarding place
was not packed full with vehicles when there
were no ships to take them aboard. Slowly the
front line around Breskens and Terneuzen was
shortening. The largest number of ships - 75 was now available for the evacuation. The 2nd
Artillerietrager Flotilla (KapiUinleutnant von
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Haxhausen) joined the ships on the Scheidt. They
were placed as floating batteries. It was also the
first time that 10,000 men with their equipment
were ferried across in a single day.
On this day it was Terneuzen's turn to be
bombarded. Because the telephone connection
was put out of commission, Kapitc'inleutnant der
Reserve W. Peters received the order to go and
check. With the R-83 they left the harbour of
Vlissingen and found that Terneuzen was afire.
The loading dock in the outer harbour was
destroyed and three lighters sunk. The much
more valuable inner harbour was still intact.
Personal losses were small, but it took 24 hours
before everything was functional again. The units
left on the south side of the Scheidt started to
worry whether they would be able to reach the
other side and leave South Beveland. The
possible loss of Woensdrecht was the cause of
this fear. The ferry Queen Emma received a
direct hit on the rear deck. The number of air
attacks on the retiring troops was increasing
constantly.
14 September
The B-Dienst at Veere was successful in the
interception of messages regarding impending
air attacks. The early wamings allowed ships to
leave the harbours. This day more than 10,000
men were ferried across. A new route came into
use, Ellewoutsdijk-Hansweert. It was along this
route that most of the infantry was brought
across.
15 September
While the crossing was in full swing a heavy
air attack took place on Vlissingen. However, due
to the earlier precautions, the attack had
minimal effect. The number of casualties among
the troops was small.
16 September
The dead of the previous day's attack, among
them the Navy Officer who coordinated the
technical supplies, Leutnant Ubben, were buried
without the interference of air attack. More than
10,000 men were brought across Terneuzen and
this again got the attention of the Allied air forces,
but the ferrying carried on.

17 September
This day the dykes of the isle of Walcheren
were bombed to let in the sea water. Terneuzen
came under fire by Allied artillery. Preparations
were made for the laying of a mine barricade
nearDoel.
18 September
Only the 64th Infantry Division was still on
the south side of the Scheidt. This Division would
stay behind to hold Breskens as long as possible.
It was not until October that these units were
ferried to Walcheren, but by then the Island was
encircled. At Terneuzen only one demolition
group stayed behind, all other men were ferried
to Hansweert.
The hospital ships with clear Red Cross
markings did their work without much ado.
Doctors did their best to save the wounded from
the fate of prisoners of war. They were
transported along the Dutch inland waterways
to Wesel and Emden. There were two hospital
ships attacked by fighter-bombers, one was sunk
between Veere and Dordrecht and the other was
set afire and grounded near Zijpe.
19 September
R-83 and R-85 sailed under the protection
of darkness to Terneuzen to pick up the
demolition group. Early in the moming they were
taken aboard under enemy fire and sailed back
to Vlissingen. Troops continued to be ferried
across from Breskens to Vlissingen. These
combat troops displayed good discipline.

The completion of the mine barricade at Doel
suffered delay because the rubber closure rings
of the mines had to be replaced, for there was
leakage. It took two days for this to occur, after
which the mines were set.
20 September
The crossing of the 15th Army was completed
and reported to Vice-Admiral Kleikamp. He gave
the order for Sonderstab Knuth to return to
Utrecht.
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21 September
Knuth and his people began the return trip.
They made a short stop at the staff of the 15th
Army in Dordrecht and the lst Artillerietrager
Flotilla after which they reached Utrecht at
2315 hours. A small welcome party was held
and the Sonderstab was eliminated without any
fanfare. In retrospect, Knuth could look back
on a very successful operation. Thanks to his
activity, 100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000
horse-drawn wagons and 750 artillery pieces
(from 2 em cannon to 21 em railway guns) were
ferried across to fight again. In total, nine
divisions were brought across- the 59th, 70th,
245th, 33lst, 344th, 346th, 7ll th and 712nd
Infantry Divisions and the 17th Luftwaffe Field
Division.
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Concluding Remarks
n the same day that Sonderstab Knuth
completed its task, 21 September, the
Royal Navy, formed Force "T' at Brugge to ferry
Allied troops across the Westerscheldt. The long
awaited closure of South Beveland finally took
place with the breakthrough of the Canadian
troops at Woensdrecht on 4 October. This closed
off the only land escape route. There still
followed a bitter battle for the Breskens pocket
and the isles ofWalcheren and South Beveland
before the channel to Antwerp could be opened
for shipping. The 15th Army stayed in the
Netherlands for a few more months and was
then set in for the defence of the Rhine. In
December they took positions around Koblenz.
This could have been avoided if the Allies had
pushed on to Woensdrecht right away and cut
off the escape route of the Germans.
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• 5 ships of the Rhine flotilla
• 5 ships of the River minesweeper flotilla, all supplied
wiih light anti-aircraft guns
• 3 small harbour ferries
• 35 ships of the 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla.
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intelligence services of the German Navy (8-Dienst),
see H. Bonatz, Die Deutsche Marin-Fu.nkaujklarung,
1914-1945 (1970), pp.99-106.
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